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I. Introduction

As the world economy and financial markets become increasingly more integrated,
cross-boarder securities transaction becomes a daily event. Because Unite States has the
world’s largest and arguably most liquid capital markets, it has attracted a significant
number of foreign companies to cross-list their stocks in a U.S. stock exchange.
Unavoidably, such transactions will not only bring out fortune, but also disputes between
transacting parties. Relying on the powerful federal securities law ,1 U.S. investors who
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have bought or sold such stocks have routinely sued foreign stock issuers through class
action when the stock prices went down, alleging their loss is caused by the issuer’s
misdeeds, such as a failure to disclose material financial information.2 Although such
misdeeds, if established, usually affect both U.S. investors and their foreign counterparts,
the latter could easily be dismissed by federal courts on jurisdiction or legal standing
grounds when they try to join the action.3
In order to show the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, foreign investors
who have transacted in the stocks need to pass one or both of the two jurisdictional tests
developed by federal courts.4 The “conduct” test is based on fraudulent conduct that took
place within the United States, even though “the allegedly fraudulent transactions
involved foreign investors, foreign sellers, or foreign securities.”5 The other is called
“effects” test, which requires subject matter jurisdiction be based on an adverse effects on
American investors despite the foreign involvement in the allegedly fraudulent
transactions.6 The determination of subject matter jurisdiction is “a very fact-intensive
exercise,” and foreign investors could be denied the access to a federal court due to
factual variations.7 Moreover, if a class action is particularly brought under section 11 of
the Securities Act or section 9(e) of the Exchange Act, foreign investors may be excluded
for another reason—their shares may have been bought from a foreign exchange and
therefore, they cannot satisfy the registration requirement under these two sections.8
Excluding foreign investors from securities class action while entertaining
American investors’ actions is unfair because the foreign investors may not only be
denied the same protection, but also be forced to pay for the loss of their American
counterparts when the assets of their company are used to pay for the judgment rendered
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by federal courts. This discrepant treatment of shareholders based on residence arises
because the federal substantive and procedural law may make it easier for investors to
receive compensation in the U.S. than in the issuer’s home country, even when the
underlying claim is the same. Such a prospect is especially possible if the level of
investor protection in the issuer’s home country, such as China, is much less than that
usually found in developed economies, such as United States. In 2002, the Supreme
People’s Court of China issued Several Regulations Concerning the Adjudication of Civil
Compensation of Securities Cases Based upon Misrepresentation (to be called Several
Regulations, supra).9 Although this regulation would for the first time allow the Chinese
courts to accept private law suits based on misrepresentation10, it has laid down some
substantial procedural limitations on a defrauded investor right to sue an issuer for
misdeeds.
The author believes that the current judicial interpretation of the extra-territorial
application of the federal securities law is against the equal treatment principle of the
traditional corporate law. Such unequal treatment is not justified because the affected
foreign shareholders did not bargain for such an arrangement. Moreover, the unequal
treatment will degrade the market integrity and will hurt the U.S. interests in the longer
run. Therefore, the Court and the legislators should consider making adjustment to the
current approach towards such litigations. Possible solutions may include extending
subject matter jurisdiction to foreign investors, through a contractual arrangement where
transacting parties could negotiate a dispute resolution regardless of the scope of the
transaction, or through a reciprocal treaty arrangement so the applicable forum and law
could be uniform for all investors involved.
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II. Unequal Treatment of Foreign Shareholders under Current Legal Scheme

To understand the effects of the United States’ discriminatory treatment of foreign
plaintiffs in the context of securities class actions, it is necessary to appreciate the
differences that inhere in the securities regulatory schemes between United States and
other countries. This part will mainly discuss the legislative and judicial development of
the extraterritorial application of the federal securites law, and the possible negative
effects under the current approach. Part III will use China as an exmaple to illustrate the
points made here.

A. Private Right of Action under Federal Securities Law

Both Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934 grant private rights of
actions against an issuer due to its misdeeds. Most important of such rights include
sections 11, 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, and sections 9(e), 18 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.11 In addition, courts have also developed an implied private right
of action from section 10 of the Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC Rule 10b-5.12 The
reason that an issuer is given particular attention here is that a U.S. court can force a
foreign shareholder to pay for the loss of American one only if the defendant in the class
action is the issuer.13 As we will see, whether such shareholders can be included in a class
action does not depend on whether they are innocent, nor on whether they have suffered
similarly from the alleged misdeeds of the issuer.
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Section 11 of the 1933 Act gives an express cause of action for any “untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein
or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,”14 it limits the availability of
such an action to the purchasers (instead of both seller and purchaser) of the security only;
and only if such securities are sold under a registration statement filed with SEC.15
Therefore, in case of a double-listing, a foreign investor will not have the same remedy as
an American investor if he buys from a foreign exchange because his shares are not
subject to the registration requirements,16 even if he has suffered loss due to the same
false disclosure as the American investor. Similarly, a foreign investor who bought a
double-listed company’s shares in a foreign exchange cannot rely on section 9(e) of the
1934 Act, which provides a civil remedy to any person who buys or sells a security at a
price affected by specified activities designed to manipulate the price of any security
registered on a national exchange.17
If a class action is brought under section 12(a)(2) (of the Securities Act), section
18 (of the Exchange Act), or the implied right of action based on section 10b or rule 10b5, foreign plaintiffs can be included in class action if their claims satisfy the subject
matter jurisdiction requirement of the federal securities law. The interpretation of such
requirement in turn depends on courts’ understanding of the scope of the extra-territorial
application of federal securities law. Unfortunately, federal courts have not considered
the foreign investors’ possible loss as relevant to their decisions.
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B. Courts’ Interpretation of the Extra-Territorial Application of Federal Securities Law

The extraterritorial application of federal economic law first appeared in antitrust
cases under Sherman Act.18 Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Company of
America reasoned that
[T]he only question open [before a court] is whether Congress intended to impose
the liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so: as a court of
the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law. Nevertheless, it is quite
true that we are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without
regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of
their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the
‘Conflict of Laws.’ … On the other hand, it is settled law- as ‘Limited’ itself
agrees- that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily
recognize. 148 F.2d at 443.
Because “Alcoa’s assertion has been roundly disputed by many foreign
commentators as being in conflict with international law, comity, and good
judgment[,]”19 some other circuits did not follow strictly ALCOA, but instead stressed in
applying domestic law on foreign entities, it may be necessary to consider the conflicting
interests of a foreign nation.20 For example, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
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The effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations
interests… [T]he test which determines whether United States law is applicable
must focus on the nexus between the parties and their practices and the United
States, not on the mechanical circumstances of effect on commodity exports or
imports.
American courts have, in fact, often displayed a regard for comity and the
prerogatives of other nations and considered their interests as well as other parts
of the factual circumstances, even when professing to apply an effects test. To
some degree, the requirement for a “substantial” effect may silently incorporate
these additional considerations, with “substantial” as a flexible standard that
varies with other factors.21 [stress added]
The “effects” and “conduct” tests used by courts in securities litigation followed
the same analysis.22 The effects test requires a court to determine whether misdeeds have
a “substantial adverse effect” that has affected specific investors or other entities in the
United States. The conduct test developed from the recognition that “Congress does not
want ‘the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security device
for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners.’”23 Some courts may use a
mixture of the two—for e.g., the Second Circuit has held in Bersch v. Drexel Firstone,
“the effects and conduct tests need ‘not be applied separately and distinctly from each
other’ and that, in fact, ‘an admixture or combination of the two often gives a better
picture of whether there is sufficient United States involvement to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by an American court.”24 Therefore, the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws
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(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the United
States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance
occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if, but
only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the United
States have significantly contributed thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United
States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States directly
caused such losses.25
Using such a test, the Second Circuit in Bersch decided to eliminate from the
class all purchasers other than persons who were residents or citizens of the United States
because the alleged fraudulent conduct mainly happened outside of United States;
although certain actions related to the alleged fraud were committed in the U.S., they
were merely preparatory and would not satisfy the conduct test for those foreign
shareholders affected by the alleged fraudulent actions. Thus, courts have limited the
reach of either test by requiring a strong nexus of the acts and the parties involved (in
conduct test),26 or a sufficient U.S. interest in entertaining the underlying complaints (in
effects test).27 Therefore, regardless of the tests used, there is always a danger to the
foreign investors’ claim against foreign issuers because the “connection” between their
claim and the United States is deemed too insignificant, even though they may have
suffered loss due to the same reason as American investors.28

8

C. Harm of Eliminating Foreign Investors from Securities Class Action

Eliminating the foreign investors from securities class action based on jurisdiction
deficiency is not a sound policy choice. First, in so ruling, the courts will be forcing the at
least equally innocent investors to pay for the loss of their American counterparts.
Although federal securities law does not have comprehensive requirements that
shareholders be treated equally in all aspects, it does require equal treatment be applied in
certain areas. For example, the "best price rule" requires a company making a tender offer
to pay all tendering shareholders the same price for their shares.29 In addition, the
interpretation of the antifraud provision by courts have never indicated that foreign
investors should be treated less favorably either. Moreover, traditional corporate law also
require all shareholders be treated equally in most aspects, such as tender offer, profit
distribution; if occasionally equal treatment is not possible,30 corporate law requires
shareholders be treated fairly—which means that at least a corporate board had a
fiduciary duty (all other things being equal) to ensure that all stockholders were treated
alike and that no one stockholder received a benefit at the cost of another.31 Although
such an obligation of equal treatment usually falls upon dominant shareholders or a board
of directors, rejecting a class certification where foreign investors have been included
will undermine this long-standing principle in state corporate law. Neither does the
language of the federal securities law require courts to interpret its extraterritorial reach
in such a way as to override this principle and such a drastic change cannot be implied
from the statute without Congress express intention.32
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Even if courts stick to the conduct-effects scheme, courts should still grant subject
matter jurisdiction to foreign investors because the fast-advancing communications
technology makes fraud-on-the-market theory increasingly more real. Although this
theory has been rejected by the D.C. District in In re Baan Co. Securities Litigation, in
which the court held that “employing that [fraud on the market] doctrine to fulfill the
requirements of the conduct test would extend the reach of the 1934 too far[,]”33 courts
should reconsider such a proposal due to the changing securities transaction environment.
Second, denying foreign investors’ claim based on jurisdiction in securities class
actions may also have the negative consequence of deterring foreign companies from
entering the US capital markets and thus depriving the American investors an opportunity
to diversify their portfolios. Although US capital markets may still be the most liquid one
in the world, the integration of the world economy and financial markets has pushed
many other international exchanges to adopt reforms to lower their cost and increase their
service level for their international clients. For example, both London Stock Exchange
and Hong Kong Stock Exchange have actively seeking foreign companies and changed
their listing rules to be more favorable to foreign issuers.34 Preventing plaintiffs to be
added in securities class actions will not decrease the chances of being sued in a US court.
On the contrary, foreign investors will at least get some assurance that they will be not
ripped off by US legal system if they know they are protected the same way as their
American counterparts. This assurance may encourage foreign shareholders to support a
management plan to make a public offering in the United States. However, a possible
concurrent effect would be that if any violation is found on the part of an issuer, the
possible liability will increase if foreign investors are also included, which may deter a
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management team from going abroad in the first place. What is the net effect of the two
factors? This may require some empirical evidence—but I guess the unequal treatment is
a more realistic threat than a possible larger damage to be granted by the court because
after all, the former is an institutionalized discrimination while the latter is the result of
equal application of securities law. Hence, disallowing foreign investors in securities
class action may lower the attractiveness of the US capital markets in the long run.
Courts treatment of foreign investors are not very sound also for practical reasons.
First, courts’ concern about the limited judicial resources when foreign investors are
involved is not very reasonable because adding them to the class that has already been
formed by American residents will not significantly increase the cost to the already
expensive litigation—most discovery, which may include anything that is related to the
alleged misdeeds, will be conducted regardless of whether such investors are included in
the class or not.
Second, the less favorable treatment of foreign investor cannot be justified by the
argument that an issuer has chosen to accept such a result when it decides to go abroad.
One problem of this reasoning is that the foreign investors did not make such choice—
although there may be a shareholders approval requirement for any decision to go listing
overseas, the power imbalance between the management and the minority shareholders
will often make such safeguard more nominal than real.35 Moreover, the fact-intensive
determination jurisdiction has made any risk-adjustment in advance on the part of
investors very difficult to quantify—should foreign shareholders expect that they will not
be treated less favorably because their reside outside of United States? (Don’t people say
U.S. has the most stringent investor protection regulation in the world?) Even if the
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answer is yes, how much premium can one investor expect to receive in order to vote for
a listing in the United States?
Third, the res judicata concern courts sometimes used to defend its refusal to
entertain foreign investors’ claims is not defendable either. Such concern is raised
because courts do not want to spend time and money to entertain a case if the losing party
can always relitigate it in his home country again.36 However, since our attention here is
the unequal treatment of shareholders from countries with much less protection than the
United States, it is not too risky to assume that such concern may not materialize after all
despite of the fact that civil law countries’ res judicata doctrine is much narrower in
scope than its common law counterpart. The more probable cause for concern in judicial
cooperation in our case is whether a foreign court would likely enforce a favorable
judgment for the defendant by a US court.37 Nevertheless, because such litigation will
predominantly involve foreign companies listed in the United States, the fear that they
can be immune from unfavorable judgment is not very realistic.
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III. Private Securities Litigation in China

To illustrate the effects of different treatment of foreign investors, one just needs
to turn to China because its securities market has a very short history and one would
reasonably assume that it has a weak investor protection. Indeed, in China, an investor’s
rights to sue an issuer for misdeeds are limited to those specified in Several Regulations
issued by the Supreme People’s Court in 2003.38 They differ from those available to an
U.S. investor, both substantively and procedurally, in the following several aspects:
1) Investors may bring civil action only for misrepresentation of information –
but not for insider trading or market manipulation.
2) Courts are allowed to hear cases, but only after the CSRC had investigated
them and had found wrongdoing. Such a requirement may give CSRC an
incentive to issue a “warning” instead of a misdeed determination in order to
discipline issuers—although CSRC also has strong incentive to maintain the
market integrity, the fact that the majority of the publicly traded companies in
China are controlled by the state may cause CSRC think twice before it takes
such severe action to punish wrongdoers.
3) Cases are subject to a two-year statutory limitation, running from the CSRC’s
determination of any wrongdoing.
4) Collective actions are allowed for private litigation, but not class actions.
Therefore, unless one has opted in before the litigation starts, he cannot expect
to receive any compensation as he would in a class action.
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5) A court’s (personal) jurisdiction over such claims is limited to where the
issuer is located—because of the interrelationship between government and
enterprises, and that between government and courts, there may be a strong
local bias against such private law suits.
6) Law suits are not allowed in private transactions or transaction conducted
outside of the state-approved securities markets. This means neither private
transactions, nor transactions conducted in a foreign country, will be protected
under this new rule.
7) Courts shall deny causal relationship between false disclosure and investor
losses when he buys a security prior to the false disclosure or sells a security
before the falsity of disclosure is publicly revealed. Thus, an investor cannot
bring a suit even if he suffered losses because he sold his security at a price
lower than it could be if the issuer had disclosed the hidden good news.39

All such requirements may have contributed to the Chinese investors’ difficulties
to obtain favorable judgments from the issuers.40 This should be of no concern to legal
scholars if the effects of such regulation are limited to China. However, with more and
more U.S. investors, both private and institutional, prepared to make equity investment in
Chinese companies,41 the American legal system has to answer the question whether
excluding foreign investors based on the current jurisdiction analysis by courts benefits
the country in the long run.
But why would the Chinese government have such a kind of rule? Isn’t this kind
of investor protection ostensibly inadequate? Before we accuse the Chinese government

14

for their “failure,” a little history of China’s economic and financial market reform will
help us to understand maybe its adopted policy is not so “unreasonable” as it seems in the
first place and may point out some solutions for the future. Moreover, China is just one
example of the much larger problem caused by the differences existing in the world’s
different legal systems. Such differences not only create different “classes” of
shareholder but also enable some shareholder’s oppression of others. Therefore, even if
it’s well expected that China will push for more reform in investor protection, it is still
worthwhile to know what we can do to address the inequalities caused by different
national securities laws.
In the early nineties, the Chinese leaders realized that in order to improve its
international competitiveness and to transform the loss-making state enterprises into selfsustaining modern corporations, they have to push for an economic reform through which
the state-owned factories could then be held accountable for its performance.42 This
prompted the so called “modern enterprise reform,” by which the government tried to
cultivate a sense of responsibility among the managers by changing their evaluation
standard from production to profit.43 As a necessary part of this reform, the government
needs to inject large amounts of money into these state-owned companies before they
could be left on their own. Part of this money could come from the public offerings of
such companies’ shares. However, when this reform is first put into practice in the early
nineties, the officials in charge of such reforms also had to worry the market reform
might offend some conservative political figures.44 For example, they had to ensure the
reform would not deviate too much from the traditional socialism theory that the
production resources should be controlled by the state so that economy could be planned
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by a central government to avoid market failures.45 Thus, in order to allay the fears of the
conservatives, as well as to avoid the potential political disorder that may be brought by
the sudden change in social ideology (as witnessed in the eastern Europe and former
Soviet Union in the early nineties),46 the reformists wanted to make sure that the reform
will at least keep the state’s majority ownership in those former SOEs.47 Therefore, the
regulators designed a unique share structure, in which the shares of a company are
divided into three types: state shares, legal person shares, tradable shares.48 For our
purposes, state shares and legal person shares could be treated as one type—both are nontradable shares held by government or semi-governmental asset management companies.
One thing to be noted here is that the concept of non-tradable shares in Chinese securities
markets is different from that of unregistered shares as in United States—unregistered
shares are still transferable—the only limitation is that the transfer cannot be
consummated by a “public offering” as defined by the Securities Act of 1934 and
relevant case law. Moreover, as long as the company decides to take the trouble to meet
certain demands, such as information disclosure, public distribution of such shares will be
allowed. Here, “non-tradable” means such shares cannot be offered to anyone other than
a state asset management entity and there is no such thing as a registration for such nontradable shares. If any such shares are to be sold to a non-governmental entities, they
have to secure a special government approval.
Under such a scheme, China’s capital markets have grown at a tremendous
speed—till 01/16/2006, the two exchanges in China have a combined market
capitalization of 3395.9 billion yuan ($415.6 billion), second only to Japan in Asia.49
Thus, to a certain degree the government realized its dual goal—injecting capital
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injection while keeping control over these former SOEs. However, this immediate
convenience also fostered quite a unique corporate governance problem that has been
pestering the Chinese securities market and regulators ever since—now the state still
retains the control over all major business decisions and the shareholders of the tradable
stocks are effectively precluded from participating in or monitoring the management of
these now “public” companies. Moreover, for fear that the courts are not ready to deal
with the any possible claims against the issuers by defrauded investors, the court system
was instructed not to accept such complaints—thus, minority shareholders almost
completely lost their right to monitor the control persons in their companies. Although
the National People’s Congress and the CSRC have passed numerous legislations as well
as regulations in areas like corporate governance,50 disclosure obligations, and insider
trading,51 they have failed largely to rekindle domestic investors’ confidence in these
listed companies.52 When more SOEs are due for a capital injection, suddenly everybody
with such shares seems to have realized that they have become the last fools—and hence
the sluggish market performance since 2000.53
Given such a background, the Supreme People’s Court decided to revoke its
policy not to accept private investor’s law suits. Although it still insists the Chinese
courts are not fully equipped with the necessary judiciary expertise in such area, it is
willing to make some concession. It’s not clear how the Court has been able to impose
such substantial limitations as to an investor’s standing in contradiction of the express
terms of the Securities Law of 1997, but it does not seem anyone, including the CSRC, is
willing to question its constitutionality.54 Therefore, the Regulation, though falling short
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of many people’s expectation, may be deemed a significant improvement compared with
its prior ban of private securities litigation.
At the same time, in order to further the reform in the capital structure and the
management control, the Chinese government changed its policy on securities market on
two key aspects. First, it decides to eventually sell off state interest in all enterprises
except for a few that the government regard as strategically important. Second, it also
began to gradually allow foreign investors to make equity investment in Chinese
companies (as one of the first steps to enable China be integrated into the international
capital markets). A series of rules were then promulgated to implement these new ideas.
Several of the most important ones are discussed below.
First, foreign investors could purchase of tradable shares from the Chinese
securities exchanges under the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors
program(“QFII”)55, or through equity investment by foreign investor through securities
fund established under the Regulations of Fund Management Companies (“FM”)56.
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors ("QFII") are defined in this Regulation as
overseas fund management institutions, insurance companies, securities companies and
other assets management institutions which have been approved by China Securities
Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as "CSRC") to invest in China's
securities market and granted investment quota by State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (hereinafter referred to as "SAFE").57 Similarly, FM allows foreign investors to
invest in tradable shares through a securities management fund. Both programs require
foreign investors to be financial institutions with sound record and certain minimum
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capital size. Since these two program have been introduced only recently, no disputes
have arisen to a litigation stage, either in China or other countries.58
Second, purchase of non-tradable shares through private placement.59 As
mentioned earlier, all such sales of legal-person and state-owned shares must seek special
approval process first. In order to keep its promise made in its WTO membership
application, and also in order to help with the problems created by the separation of
tradable and non-tradable stock markets, China has started to allow the transfer of the
non-tradable state-owned or legal-person shares to foreign investors.60 Such shares will
then become tradable, although not eligible for public offering through stock
exchanges.61 Disputes arising from these transactions are not covered by Several
Regulations, which only regulates securities transaction consummated through stateapproved exchanges. However, such investors will usually receive comprehensive
contractual protections. RBS’ investment in Bank of China (BOC), the second largest
bank in China, is just one such example.62 It was reported that RBS would receive
compensation over three years if (a) the joint venture between RBS and BOC performs
poorly, (b) BOC's initial public offering (IPO) price falls below the price that RBS paid
for its investment, or (c) BOC's net asset value declines year-over-year.63 Temasek, a
Singaporean investment company, is also believed to have negotiated similar provisions
for its stake in BOC.64 Therefore for minority foreign shareholders, these guarantee
provisions will no doubt add some downside protection to the value of their
investments.65 While foreign investors in China may wan to keep their long-standing
relationship with the state at stake, their profit orientation may very well drive them to
invoke the guarantee provisions if necessary.66
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The above two types of transactions will most likely not pose the unequal
treatment problem by a U.S. court. Transaction of the first type is conducted outside of
US and only affects sophisticated investors who have intentionally decided to go into the
Chinese securities market—so it cannot satisfy either the conduct or the effect test even
for American investors. For the second type, although private placement may be covered
by the federal securities law, the contractual protections could be so generous that it is
less desirable for the overseas investors to go to a court; moreover, possible arbitration
clause may also prevent investors to seek remedy in a US court.67 Besides, most of the
second type of transactions happen before the company goes public—therefore, it’s
usually a transaction just between a state entity and a foreign investor, and there will be
no third party effect.68
Problems will arise when the underlying dispute is due to a Chinese company’s
overseas public offering.69 It is here that a US federal court is most likely to get involved
and creates unequal treatments for shareholders. American residents can always bring law
suits against foreign stock issuers under the federal securities law if the stock is offered
through a U.S. stock exchange because their claims satisfy both the conduct or the effects
test.70 It is here a defendant issuer will argue that under the US law, non-US transactions
shall be excluded from the class. Excluding such non-US investors not only means less
litigation cost to a defendant issuer (supposedly, there will be less time spent on noreliance defense), it may also significantly reduce any possible payout on the part of the
issuer or control shareholder. For example, a certain feasance or non-feasance may be
deemed fraud in the United States but only “irregularity” in Germany—therefore the
possible compensation in a German court may be lower than that in US. Of course, one of
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the most extreme disparities can be found in a China-US case—as we talked above, a
compensable misdeed in US may not even be allowed to be brought to a court.71 In case
of a double listing in the US and China by a Chinese issuer,72 if subsequently the issuer is
not satisfied with its stock price, it might promulgate misinformation in Chinese to
Chinese media to boost the price. On the other hand, it makes sure it does not do anything
wrong in the US. The stock prices first go up in China, but later also in the US, either
because the Wall Street gradually hears the news or because the space arbitrage
(assuming arbitrage can be done despite capital regulation by the Chinese government).
Gradually investor become suspicious and prices begin to fall in both countries.
American investors then sue the issuer in the US and submit a class certification
including the Chinese investors. But the court disagrees—presumably because the
fraudulent conduct happens outside of United States and the foreign investors loss does
not have a significant impact on U.S. capital markets based on past interpretation.73 In
China, CSRC investigates the matter but decides only to give the issuer a warning.
Therefore, no remedy for the Chinese investor. However, the issuer still achieves its goal
to boost the prices temporarily. The cost of this effort is minor—since it has relatively
few American investors, compensation to them may be minor.
If this is what will happen in the future, rejecting foreign investors’ claim could
seriously undermine the regulator’s goal to maintain the market integrity.74 Although in
theory there are pros and cons for a cross-listing in the US—for the pros, better reputation,
more liquidity, etc; on the con side, more stringent regulation,75 if a court distinguishes a
claim based on a plaintiff’s residence, the issuer could be induced to take some strategic
action so that it could take the full advantage of the pros but limit effect of the cons to a
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substantial degree. For example, the issuer could choose to offer only a very limited
number of shares in the United States, thus get the reputation boost and maybe receive
higher prices for its stocks elsewhere; then it makes sure that any problematic disclosure
or transactions are done outside of the United States—therefore, US courts will not have
a general jurisdiction over claims brought by those who suffered from outside of the
US—if there’s any damage to the US investors, it will be very limited. Can the US still
claim that the securities law is to protect market integrity in such cases?
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III. Proposed Solutions

Is there a better arrangement for the US to utilize than to blame other countries’
inefficiency? After all, applying securities law in this discriminatory way does look it is
“designed to permit local actors to enjoy the benefits of an activity while exporting the
harm.”76 According to Guzman, treating foreign plaintiffs differently from domestic ones
is inefficient as it allows globally inefficient activities to take place.”77 Three propositions,
which can be readily discerned from the above discussion, will be discussed below.

A. Extending Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Federal Securities Law
One direct response is just to extend subject matter jurisdiction to foreign investors’
claims, if such foreign investors will otherwise be prejudiced in favor of their American
counterparts. This could be achieved through either judicial reinterpretation or legislative
actions. As mentioned above, such reinterpretation will be more in line with the common
law principle of each treatment of shareholders.78 Such treatment is neither a complete
break with history because case law indicates courts do consider the availability of laws
similar to the federal securities law in other countries’ as a factor in their subject matter
jurisdiction consideration.79 For such a scheme to work, however, several obstacles need
to be overcome first.

1. Class Certification
Although US courts admit that there are no per se rules against the certification of a
class that includes both domestic and foreign investors,80 in order to be included in a class,
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plaintiffs must meet the four-pronged test set out in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
section 23(a), which states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.81
It does not seem that foreign plaintiffs will need to overcome barriers different from those
facing U.S. investors in order to be joined in a class, if subject matter jurisdiction is
conceded by a court. Moreover, courts have said that “[i]n securities transactions where
the complaints were based on the same ‘public statements and reports’ consolidation is
appropriate if there are common questions of law and fact and the defendant will not be
prejudiced.”82 Therefore, consolidation should not be a barrier for a foreign investor.

2. Substantive Law Analysis
Courts in general require the following elements in order to establish liability: (1)
the defendant made a misrepresentation; (2) the misrepresentation concerned one or more
material fact(s); (3) the misrepresentation was made knowingly, or with reckless
disregard for the truth thereof, and with the intent to deceive or defraud; (4) the defendant
made the misrepresentation “in connection with” a purchase or sale of securities; (5) the
misrepresentation was made through interstate commerce, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange; (6) the plaintiff relied upon defendant's misrepresentation;
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and, as a consequence of plaintiff's reliance, purchased (or sold) the security in question;
and (7) the defendant's misrepresentation is the proximate cause of plaintiff’s monetary
damage.83
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving all elements of the cause of action
brought under an express provision of the securities laws, or under SEC Rule 10b-5 as
construed by the courts.84 All such elements have been analyzed extensively by courts
and legal scholars,85 hence we need only to stress the unique aspects of a case where both
foreign issuer and foreign investors are involved.

a. Communication Barrier and Proving Investor’s Reliance

Because it is impractical for most injured investors to prove reliance in securities
class action,86 reliance is presumed to exist in two typical scenarios: the “Affiliated Ute”
type,87 and the “fraud-on-the-market” situation.88 In the situation, the investor may
recover under § 10(b) without a showing of reliance on the failure to disclose, if a person
under a duty to disclose material information to an investor fails to do so. Later cases
interpret this ruling as meaning reliance will be presumed if the defendant fails to
disclose material information while he has a duty to do so. In the context of class actions
involving both American and foreign plaintiffs, a natural follow-up question would be,
what if the duty to the American investors is different from that to a Chinese investor?
For example, under the US law, there is a duty to disclose certain information to the US
investors, but the Chinese law does not require so. Can courts still presume reliance for
the Chinese investors who have been consolidated in the class?
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I believe the answer should be Yes—otherwise, equal treatment of shareholders
cannot be realized. Moreover, the issuer has voluntarily agreed to be governed by the U.S.
securities law when it decides to make a public offering here.89 By choosing a higher
regulatory standard, an issuer is not just buying an admission ticket to the U.S. capital
market, it also stimulates investors outside of United States to be more interested in such
stocks and thus, increase the financing capability of the issuer. Thus, an issuer does
receive something in return when being required comply with a higher regulatory
standard. If such obligation is consistently (instead of on a case-by-case basis) imposed
on a foreign issuer, it will develop such an expectation that it shall comply with a higher
standard. Hence, it will no longer be able to raise the argument that it has relied on its
home country’s securities law to decide whether to make certain disclosure. Nevertheless,
such suggestion is based on the assumption that the US law does afford a higher standard
of investor protection. It will be much trickier if the difference is something other than
the different level of protection.
As to the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Supreme Court recognized its validity in
Levinson, which “obviates the necessity that a plaintiff prove reliance and, instead,
permits the rebuttable presumption that a plaintiff relied on the integrity of the market
price in purchasing his or her shares of stock.90 However, the presumption of reliance is
appropriate only if the company's stock was traded in an ‘efficient market.’”91 Courts
have generally followed a five-factor test to determine market efficiency, namely, (1)
whether there was a large weekly trading volume; (2) the existence of a significant
number of reports by securities analysts; (3) the existence of market makers and
arbitrageurs in the security; (4) the eligibility of the company to file an S-3 Registration
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Statement; and (5) a history of immediate movement of the stock price.92 Case law has
concentrated on the individual character of the underlying securities being traded—for
e.g., whether a thinly traded security has a efficient market.93
Should such a test be applied to stocks traded on an exchange outside of United
States? It’s not hard to imagine that due to the different regulation environment, history,
economic conditions, etc, the operation of Chinese securities market might be very
different from that of United States. Hence, is it necessary for the concept of “market” to
include the trading market of the stock in China? Empirical studies do not seem to point
to a conclusive result.94 In addition, such studies do not suggest any individual stock has
an efficient trading market—and there is still the question of whether information is
efficient across border for such double-listed stocks. For e.g., how is a stock going to
react if an alleged wrongdoer issued a false report in United States, but did not do so in
China? Or vice versa? How about the report is only in English, while most investors in
China do not read English?
Nevertheless, even if a stock does not have an efficient market in one trading
market, space arbitrage will probably eliminate a double- or triple-listed stock’s trading
inefficiency in emerging markets.95 Therefore, “given the unity of information with
which the foreign and domestic markets now trade, and the effect each exchange has on
the pricing of the other exchange, the purchasers on the foreign exchanges should also be
entitled to the presumption of reliance on an efficient market.”96 However, space
arbitrage has a prerequisite—the free flow of capital, which is not currently available in
China because the Chinese government still does not allow the free convertibility of its
current in capital accounts.97 However, the gradual liberalization of the capital markets is
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a stated goal of the Chinese government.98 The measures in the past several years,
including the gradual transformation of the fixed-exchange rate to a more flexible one
and the opening up of the securities market to foreign institutional investors,99 indicate
that space arbitrage may become easier in the future and hence the improved efficiency
in securities trading both within and without China.

b. Judicial Assistance for Discovery Request

In general, civil discovery request by the U.S. has seldom been honored by
Chinese courts and such attempts by U.S. attorneys without authorization from Chinese
government may be criminally punished.100 However, in the context of securities
litigations involving Chinese issuers, things may be a little different because of the many
conflicting forces at play: first, the issuers may have a huge incentive to cooperate with
the US courts to keep the U.S. capital markets available; second, other players in such
litigations, due to the traditional state ownership and control of enterprises, government
units may have influenced the actions of the issuers that could well be the center of a civil
litigation in the United States—therefore, the government may want to cut US courts’
hands off themselves; and third, the Chinese government also has its judicial sovereign
concerns.
However, adding Chinese investors to a securities class action brought in the
United States does not necessarily make such discovery more difficult—the same barriers
mentioned above will be experienced no matter they are added or not. The only
additional burden will be the discovery as to the reliance element by the Chinese
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investors—if fraud-on-the-market is applied across the national borderline, even such
additional work is not necessary. Moreover, the existence of such difficulties does not
necessarily mean that the cooperation of the U.S. and Chinese courts is impossible.
Actually, private securities litigation may be one of the easiest area for substantive
cooperation. First, the primary regulator of the Chinese securities market, CSRC, has
shown keen interest in promoting the market integrity by borrowing experience from the
U.S.—not only has it adopted many disclosure rules that mimic their American
counterparts, it has also promised more cooperation with the SEC.101 Second, securities
regulation is an area where ideology only plays a minimum part and hence there will be
few, if any, political barriers against more reforms. Third, cooperation with the U.S.
judicial systems is in the Chinese investors’ own interest to guard against issuers’ power
abuse. Fourth, the Chinese central government has strong interests in cooperating with
United States because it expects to receive some return benefits in other fields—for
example, China is working hard to get the U.S.’ assistance in its criminal investigations
against corrupt officials who have fled to the United States with huge amount of
embezzled cash.102 Although Chinese court system may not welcome such cooperation as
it will undermine its authority and add to its workload, it does not necessarily have that
kind of power to obstruct it. Mr. Xiao Yang, the President of the Supreme People’s Court,
a position that in name is equal to the premiership of the central government under the
Chinese Constitution, only retains a membership of the Central Committee of the
Community Party, a position far less glamorous than that of the politburo.103 The Chinese
court systems have also received very fierce criticism from almost all sides of the
society…104
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c. Section 11 and Section 9 Problem

If an action is brought under section 11 of the Securities Act or section 9 of the
Exchange Act, in order to ensure that foreign investors are not treated unfairly, it is
necessary for the Congress to make changes to these sections so that they will not be
excluded from being consolidated simply because they did not purchase their stocks from
a US national exchange or their purchased stocks were not registered with SEC. As
discussed in Part II(C), such legislative reform will in the long-term interests of the
United States.

B. Contractual Solution

As an alternative, parties to a securities transaction may specify a dispute
resolution arrangement through a contract, so that that potential investors will know in
advance who may be compensated, how much and in what matter can they be
compensated. For example, a stock purchase contract may include an arbitration clause
that requires any fraud allegations and concurrent compensations requests be decided by
a arbitrator, who shall observe the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. The
problem is, shall a court enforce it?
The Supreme Court has ruled that contract terms concerning choice of law or
forum will be presumed to be valid,105 and the presumptive validity of a forum selection
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clause can be overcome if the resisting party can show it is "unreasonable under the
circumstances."106 This “unreasonable” exception is to be applied narrowly—forum
selection or choice of law clause is "unreasonable" if (1) their incorporation into the
contract was the result of fraud, undue influence or overweening bargaining power,107 (2)
the selected forum is so "gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the complaining party]
will for all practical purposes be deprived of its day in court."108; or (3) if enforcement of
the clauses would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is
brought, declared by statute or judicial decision.109 Unfortunately, even such liberal
attitude can rarely help the cause to treat shareholders equally because this “private
arrangement” can hardly be extended to a publicly traded security, where thousands of
“unscrupulous” individual investors have been implicated.
The courts’ unwillingness to extend contractual arrangements to such transactions
reflects their belief that the government has a strong interest even in such “private
attorney” actions.110 However, “[securities] law is neither wholly private nor wholly
public, but is instead at times public, at times private, and at times a curious blend of the
two.”111 It’s been pointed out that certain aspects of the securities regulation scheme,
including the mandatory disclosure requirement, not only benefit the purchasers in the
offering but also help all the people in the secondary market make informed decision
based on such information furnished. Some other aspect of the securities law, and in our
case the 10b-5 antifraud provision, has more limited implication. Such conflicting
perceptions about the private securities action can sometimes be felt by federal courts.
For example, one circuit held in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. that “a contractual remedy
provision specifying in advance the forum … and the law to be applied is … an almost
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indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential
to any international business transaction … [because] such a provision obviates the
danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the
interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem involved.”112 However, a
Ninth Circuit panel decision distinguished Scherk:
“The fragmentary contacts with the United States of the contract in Scherk
distinguish that contract from the contacts here … In the securities cases
upholding arbitration clauses by virtue of the Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court
has observed that arbitration changes procedure but that arbitrator will apply the
substantive law of the United States where the law is applicable…. The strong
implication is that where there is substantial contact with the United States even
the Arbitration Act could not authorize the waiver of substantive provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts.”113
The Ninth Circuit later reversed the panel decision and upheld the arbitration clause.114
One district in the Second Cir., however, was persuaded by the panel decision in a
subsequent case (Lloyd’s)—and thus casts doubts as to the continued validity of the
presumption of validity.115
Nevertheless, even if “the private components of securities regulation have to be
backed by a public backbone,”116 it is not clear why courts have to save the investing
public’s confidence in the securities market at the expense of foreign investors who
happen to have bought stocks from the same issuer. More importantly, the effect of such
contractual protection is exactly to make sure that every shareholder’s interest, and hence
the investing public, can be protected—in this sense, a contractual term used to guarantee
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equal treatment of shareholders, such as mandatory arbitration in case of allegations
against the issuer and mandatory compensation to all non-fault shareholders in case of
“guilty” finding, will not interfere with a court’s interest of providing such a public bone.
Alternatively, if a contract arrangement cannot replace federal securities law, it
may be applied in addition to it. For example, when U.S. shareholders of a foreign issuer
bring a class action under the antifraud provision in a US court, other shareholders shall
be allowed to bring a supplemental action to enforce such their contractual rights,117 so
that in case there will be a favorable judgment to the class, they can receive an equal
amount of compensation from the issuer, or the control shareholder. Under this
arrangement, the public v. private nature of the securities law problem can be avoided.

C. Market Approach and Portable Reciprocity

A third approach to eliminate the unequal treatment of shareholders due to
shareholder litigation can be found in the “market approach” to securities regulation,
under which “[an] issuer's securities domicile controls for all securities sold in the United
States, whether that domicile is a U.S. state or a foreign nation.”118 In theory, this means
any disputes arising out of such transactions, including a private action against a foreign
issuer brought by U.S. investors, shall be governed by the substantive and procedural
rules of the issuer’s domicile country.119 However, in order to reduce the litigation cost to
the U.S. investors and to increase investment interests, it is suggested that the SEC could
require such issuers to consent to be sued in a US court, which may then apply US
procedural law.120 If this is a plausible, the unequal treatment can be partly eliminated
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because the substantive law used in such litigations will be the same—it will reduce the
possibility that an investor may be treated less fairly than his American counterpart and
that he/she will be forced to pay another’ loss. However, unless the procedural law
applied is also that of the domicile country, discrimination can still exist—especially if it
is much less favorable to the plaintiff as that in the Unite States.121
Another method related to the market approach is described by Choi and Guzman
as portable reciprocity.122 Under their theory, governments should allow an issuer of
securities to select the regulatory regime that will govern its securities. Once the regime
is selected and the issuer has complied with its requirements, securities transactions may
commence in any country without additional compliance work. Portable reciprocity is
different from the market approach in that first, it relied on the cooperation of national
governments instead of private arrangements between an issuer and a regulator; second,
Choi carries his theory one step further by proposing that the default forum for any
enforcement action should be brought in the home country of the chosen regulatory
regime. Thus, for our example, in order to avoid the different treatment of shareholders
based on residence, a Chinese issuer should be allowed to apply the relevant Chinese law
to govern its offering the United States and US investors will of course, be notified of
such choice before making any investment decisions. If any fraud allegation is brought by
an investor, discrepant treatment of shareholders can largely be avoided because
jurisdiction will not longer be a obstacle, whether he/she is an U.S. or Chinese resident
(as access to a foreign court is arranged in advance). Moreover, claims of different
shareholders will be judged by the same procedural and substantive rules. As to the
argument that this will decrease investor protection, the author would point out that this is

34

an investor choice problem—if market does not value the legal protection of a certain
country, the issuer has to make its offer otherwise very appealing in order to persuade
investors, or even apply the U.S. law if that is what the market values most. As some
scholars have pointed out, there is not empirical evidence showing that such
“deregulation” will lead to a race to the bottom.123 Again, this theory will have a strong
suggestion that securities regulation is private in nature and private parties should be
allowed to make any arrangement they want; securities law does not have to be always
paternalistic to those who cannot make rational decisions.
If such comprehensive treaty could be forged between different nations, it may
overcome all the practical difficulties we discussed in the other two choices—dispute
resolution could be conducted through neutral special arbitration process, enforcement of
the awards would bypass the protectionism of local courts, process could be cheaper, etc.
In addition, the fear of having to litigate in a courtroom that is most favorable to plaintiffs,
which has been an important deterring factor in foreign issuers’ consideration for a crosslisting in the U.S., may be eliminated under such an arrangement.124 However, “efforts on
the part of countries to construct workable international cooperation in securities
regulation, although fine in theory, are most likely to fail.”125
But there is always hope. As we have witnessed, the integration of the world
economy is an unavoidable trend for the future. This will require more streamlined
international regulatory scheme. Although it does not necessarily mean in the future one
single set of law will emerge,126 we should be confident that gradually, there will be a
forum for different countries to sort out their differences in a reasonable manner. To see
this trend, one just needs to look at China—within only about 25 years, it has emerged
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from its xenophobia and anti-capitalism as a country willing to learn from and work with
other nations. It has become a signatory to the Washington Convention on International
Settlement of Investment Disputes (WCISID), which enables member states to settle any
investment disputes through arbitration at an international forum, and the arbitration
awards can be enforced as a treaty obligation between states.127 It has joined the WTO.
The Chinese securities regulator has also signed numerous Memorandum of
Understanding with securities regulation authorities in other countries that are intended to
strengthen investor protection in the international securities market.128 The SEC and
CSRC is also planning to sign a cooperation agreement in early 2006.129 Although such
understandings cannot solve the problem we have here, it is a clear indication of China’s
willingness to enhance cooperation with other securities regulators.
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IV. Conclusion

The exclusion of foreign investors from securities class action against an foreign
issuer, whether on jurisdictional and registration ground, will result in shareholder
discrimination on the basis of residence. Although this does not seem to be a big concern
for the U.S. investors now, with the integration of international securities markets and the
rise of transnational economy, it may eventually become a disincentive for foreign
companies to seek capital in the United States and thus deprive U.S. investors’
opportunities to invest in such stocks. Moreover, it will weaken investors’ confidence that
the securities regulation scheme in the United States is designed to maintain its market
integrity. This note proposes several, instead of exhausts all, possible remedies for this
problem, including expanding the subject matter jurisdiction to foreign claims, enforcing
contractual dispute solution terms, and market approach guaranteed by treaties. Each of
these proposed solutions may have its own deficiencies—for example, to ensure foreign
shareholders can be joined in a securities class action brought in the U.S., one has to
persuade federal courts to change their long-time understanding of the subject matter
jurisdiction in extra-territorial transactions. However, it is the author’s belief that a
practical solution will eventually emerge, because it is to the long-term interest of all
countries concerned.

1

Several of the most important cause of actions are Section 10b of Exchange Act of 1934 and the relevant
SEC Rule 10b-5 (the “antifraud provisions”), which applies to both registered and unregistered offering; in
registered offering, Section 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1934. Moreover, “the remedies supplied by

37

and under [the Exchange Act and the Securities Act] are cumulative and not mutually exclusive. Jordan
Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47, 51 (7th Cir. 1968).
2

USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 23.

3

See e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974. For more references, see the Role of Foreign
Investors in Federal Securities Class Actions, 1442 PLI/Corp 91.

4

Neither the Securities Act of 1933 nor the Exchange Act of 1934 is clear as to its extraterritorial
application. See e.g., Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1995). See also, The Role of
Foreign Investors in Federal Securities Class Actions, 1442 PLI/Corp 91 at 111.

5

Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Securities Fraud Action Based on Foreign Transactions, under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 56 A.L.R. Fed. 288, section 2.

6

Id.

7

The Role of Foreign Investors in Federal Securities Class Actions, 1442 PLI/Corp 91, 114.

8

See section 11, Securities Act of 1933; Thomas Lee Hazen, Liabilities Under the 1933 Act, Fed.
Securities Law III.E.2 (2d ed.).
2. Private Rights of Action
9

Chinese version available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030110/905268.html.

10

The Chinese courts banned such suits ever since they were first brought to a court in 1998. On Sept. 21,
2001, although facing a tremendous public outcry against some issuers’ insider trading, the Supreme
People’s Court published A Notice Concerning Temporarily Banning Civil Securities Cases Related. See A
Summary of Historical Developments of Civil Compensations related to Securities Fraud, Beijing Morning,
Jan 11, 2003 issue, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/t/20030111/1154301026.shtml.

11

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa. For a general discussion of such provisions, see ‘Neither Unusual Nor
Unfortunate’: the Overlap of Rule 10b-5 with the Express Liability Sections of the Securities Acts, 60
TXLR 719.

12

See e.g., Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied by
Rodman & Renshaw v. Schaefer, 425 U.S. 943.

13

This is unlike the situation where entities other than the issuer are held liable—for e.g., actions against
directors or officers under section 16 or those abetting violation under 20(a)of the Exchange Act.

14

15 U.S.C. §§ 77k.

15

Id. Also note that section 11 of the 33 Act does not apply to offshore offering under Regulation S
because “Regulation S limits the extraterritorial application of the Securities Act by eliminating the
registration requirements for many offshore transactions and by providing greater predictability with regard
to the application of U.S. securities laws to offshore offerings.” Uri Geiger, The Case for the
Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market, 1997 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 241, 256
(1997).

16

For example, Sinopec has made its public offering in both United States and China. The shares it sold in
China are called A share while those in United States are called N shares—each is subject only to its local
registration rules.

38

17

15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e).

18

See United States v. Aluminum Company of America, xxxx; see also Robert W. Hill, Cross-Boarder
Investment, Conflict of Laws, and the Privatization of Securities Law, 55-Aut Law & Contemp. Probs. 331,
334-35.

19

Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 610.

20

Id at 611.

21

Id at 612.

22

See e.g., Bersch, 519 F.2d at 984-90 (“[W]e think, [that General adverse is not enough to grant subject
matter jurisdiction] is what Judge Hand had in mind in the remarks in his Aluminum opinion…”). See also
Hillman, Cross-Border Investment, Conflict of Laws, and the Privatization of Securities Law, 55-Aut Law
& Contemp. Probs. 331, 333-36.
23

Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122 (quoting Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983); IIT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d. Cir. 1975)). See also, 1442 PLI/Corp 91, footnote 66 for more
references.

24

1442 PLI/Corp 91 at 113.

25

Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, …

26

Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114; Tri-Star, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 576 (the level of domestic conduct must be
significant and material to the fraud and not merely preapartory)

27

Europe & Overseas, 147 F.3d at 129.

28

See e.g., Tri-Star Farm Ltd. V. Marconi PLC (the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign investors’ claims against the foreign issuer because the alleged fraudulent conduct was conceived
and carried out in the United Kingdom); Baan, (foreign investors are excluded from the class because the
alleged misconduct mainly happened outside of Untied States—even though both American and foreign
investors are affected by the misconducts)

29

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(7), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(7); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d10. Best price rule also provides for a private right of action. See Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Ltd., 133
F.Supp.2d 632, 639.

30

In Tooley v. AXA Financial, Inc., 2005 WL 1252378, the Court held in dicta that “The idea that all
stockholders should be treated equally does not apply in every circumstance, and there are occasions where
boards of directors are permitted to treat different groups of stockholders differently, as long as it is in
accordance with their fiduciary duties. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 956-957
(Del.1985)(holding that a discriminatory selective exchange offer was valid “[i]f the board of directors is
disinterested, has acted in good faith and with due care, its decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion
will be upheld as a proper exercise of business judgment.”); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1377
(Del.1993)(“It is well established in our jurisprudence that stockholders need not always be treated equally
for all purposes.”); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-56 (Del.1964). These cases demonstrate that a
board of directors, in certain circumstances, may treat different classes of stockholders unequally. In doing
so, however, they must satisfy the full import of their fiduciary duties.

31

Id at 5. This principle also prohibits non-pro-rata distributions, and thus preventing controlling
shareholders from favoring themselves. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del.
1971); Bainbridge, supra note 1, § 7.4, at 338-42.

39

32

See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (a long-existing state law cannot be
preempted by a federal law simply because they may overlap each other)

33

In re The BAAN Company Securities Litigation, 103 F.Supp.2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2000).

34

See Robert DeLaMater, Testimony before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
available at
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_08_11wrts/delamater_robert_wrts.htm.

35

Given China’s special shareholder structure, this is especially true.

36

The usual practice is that unless it could be established with some certainty that the foreign court would
give no consideration to a US court judgment, subject matter jurisdiction over foreign investors’ claim
cannot be denied solely on this ground. Vast majority of U.S. courts have rejected the Second Circuit
decision in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., as authority for the proposition that res judicata concerns
prohibit certification of a class that includes foreign members. The Role of Foreign Investors in Federal
Securities Class Actions, 1442 PLI/Corp 91, 108-111.

37

There is not a foreign judgment recognition treaty between the US and China. The Hague Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters, which is created
to harmonize the enforcement rules in different countries, has not been very successful so far and only four
countries have decided to join it. The treaty Member state information available at http://hcch.evision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=78.
38

See supra note 10.

39

Id. For a detailed interpretation, see also Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China:
Material Disclosure about China’s Legal System?, 24 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 599, 629-49.

40

For some general information about the difficulties an investor can face in such civil law suits, see A
Shareholder’s Bitter Success, available at http://cn.biz.yahoo.com/05-09-/2/ctca.html.

41

Sinopec, PetroChina, and China Life, three former state-owned enterprises with large capitalizations,
have all received positive investor reaction after their listing in New York Stock Exchange according to the
Wall Street Journal online charting.

42

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Several Decisions Concerning the Socialist
Market Economy Reform, available at http://222.66.11.66:8080/wxl/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=583.
43

Id, at section 2.

44

Premiere Zhu Rongji, Several Questions in Modern Enterprise Reform, available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/33831/33836/34152/34156/2540251.html.

45

For more discussion on this issue by Chinese orthodox theorists, see A Comment on Recent Discussion of
the Socialism, Economic Review, 1983 (author information not available), available at
http://www.dufe.edu.cn/organization/yanjiujigou/e&s/introduction/center-policy/wenxian/reform/32.doc.
46

Although a detailed study is not impossible due to political constraints, to appreciate the Communist
Party’s concern over ideology, one just needs to compare China’s history before and after it came into
power. Before Communist Party came into power, hunger had almost always been a source of social unrest;
however, in the Great Leap Forward period (1958-1960), although millions of people died from hunger or
hunger-induced diseases, the society on the whole had been relatively peaceful. Till today, many people
still believe that the difficulties were mainly caused by natural disasters and Mao suffered the same way as

40

a common peasant. For a more general discussion of that period in English, see Jasper Becker, Hungry
Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine (published by Owl Books, 1998).
47

See e.g., To Further Enhance the Basic Economic Scheme, available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1035/2165875.html.

48

For more detailed discussion, see Jiangyu Wang, China’s Securities Experiment: the Challenge of
Globalization, http://www.eastlaw.net/research/securities/sec2d.htm. The following is quoted from it.
Roughly, there are four types of shares: State shares, Legal person shares, individual shares, and
foreign capital shares. The basic rational under the classification is to control the transferability of different
types of shares: State shares and legal person shares are theoretically nontransferable, foreign shares may
only be traded in a special, closed market, and individual shares may be transferred only between Chinese
citizens.
State Shares (Guo Jia Gu) State shares refers to shares held by governmental agencies or
authorized institutions on behalf of the State. According to relevant regulations, it shall include: (1) The
shares converted from the net assets of SOEs which have been transformed into joint stack companies. (2)
Shares initially issued by companies and purchased by the governmental departments investing on behalf of
the State. (3) Shares initially issued by companies and purchased by the investment companies, assets
management companies, and economic entity companies authorized to make investment on behalf of the
State. State shares are not allowed to be traded on an open market.
Legal Person Shares (Fa Ren Gu) Legal person shares refer to shares of a joint stock company
owned by another company or institution with a legal person status. The legal person shares can be
indirectly hold by the State if the shareholders are State-owned companies. Basically, there are four types
of owners for legal personal shares, namely, state-owned legal person shares, collective enterprise legal
person shares, private enterprise legal person shares, foreign invested enterprise legal person shares, and
institutional legal person shares. The transfer and trading of legal person shares are also restricted.
Individual Shares or A Shares(Ge Ren Gu) Individual shares, with an official recognized nick name of "A
shares", refer to shares that may only be owned by Chinese citizens. A shares has the full function born by
classic stock, and it can be freely traded and transferred in domestic markets.
Foreign Capital Shares (Wai Zi Gu) Foreign capital shares include B shares and overseas listing
shares. B shares are shares which are offered exclusively to foreign investors. Like other shares, they are
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